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ACCUMULATED EARNINGS TAX AND STOCK
REDEMPTIONS-FURTHER THOUGHTS ON THE
REASONABLE BUSINESS NEEDS TEST
MICHAEL S. WEINER* AND BRUCE M. GRAHAM, JR.**
I. INTRODUCTION
F EW PENALTY TAXES HAVE BEEN IMPOSED with the frequency of the
tax on unreasonable accumulations of corporate earnings and
profits.' Any corporation "formed or availed of for the purpose of
avoiding income tax with respect to its shareholders by permitting earn-
ings and profits to accumulate instead of being divided or distributed"2
* Associate, Guren, Merritt, Sogg & Cohen, Cleveland, Ohio. B.A.,
Washington & Jefferson College; J.D., Univ. of Michigan.
** Associate, Guren, Merritt, Sogg & Cohen, Cleveland, Ohio. A.B., Princeton
Univ.; J.D., Univ. of Virginia.
I.R.C. §§ 531-537.
Other articles in the area include Altman, Improper Accumulation of Earned
Surplus: Circumstances Which Invoke the Section 531 Penalty Tax: Business
Needs; Purpose to Avoid Surtax; Multiple Corporations & Section 531, PROC.
N.Y.U. 24TH ANN. INST. FED. TAX. 805 (1966); Bradley, Stock Transfer Restric-
tions & Buy-Sell Agreements, 1969 U. ILL. L.F. 139; Canty, The Accumulated
Earnings Tax 1954 Reform" An Appraisal, 2 U. S.F. L. REV. 242 (1968); Cun-
ningham, More Than You Ever Wanted to Know About the Accumulated Earn-
ings Tax, 6 J. CORP. TAX. 187 (1979); Frost, Accumulated Earnings Tax Looms as
Threat to Buy-Out Agreements, 9 J. TAX. 324 (1958); Herwitz, Stock Redemp-
tions & the Accumulated Earnings Tax, 74 HARV. L. REV. 866 (1961); Kahn, Man-
datory Buy-Out Agreements for Stock of Closely Held Corporations, 68 MICH. L.
REV. 1 (1969); Maxfield, Recent Cases Forecast More Liberal Trend in Allowing
Accumulations to Redeem Stock, 25 J. TAX. 43 (1966); O'Neill, The Accumulated
Earnings Tax-Effects of Stock Redemptions, 46 TAXES 172 (1968); Polasky,
Planning for the Disposition of a Substantial Interest in a Closely Held Business,
46 IOWA L. REV. 516 (1961); Rudolph, Stock Redemptions & the Accumulated
Earnings Tax-An Update, 4 J. CORP. TAX. 101 (1977); Weithorn, What Con-
stitutes a "Reasonable" Corporate Accumulation?, PROC. N.Y.U. 17TH ANN. INST.
FED. TAX. 299 (1959); Weyher & Noall, Providing for Succession Through Buy-
Sell Agreements & Recapitalizations, PROC. N.Y.U. 21ST ANN. INST. FED. TAX.
445 (1963).
In the mid-sixties it was noted that the accumulated earnings penalty tax
was "the sword of most general applicability and of rapidly increasing
significance" available to the Treasury Department for the purpose of slaying
those who dared manipulate corporations for their personal tax benefit. Canty,
supra this note, at 243. At that time the number of cases litigated in the area was
rising. Although exact numbers are difficult to derive, an informal survey by the
authors seems to indicate that this may no longer be true. Nonetheless, it is fair
to state that, due to its severity, this weapon is brandished upon audit in occa-
sionally marginal circumstances. A corporate taxpayer must be able to deal with
it effectively so as to remove it from the settlement picture.
I I.R.C. § 532(a).
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is subject to the tax. However, the tax is not properly imposed where
the accumulations are for the reasonable business needs of the corpora-
tion. Accordingly, the question of what constitutes reasonable business
needs is critical. This article considers one aspect of the reasonable
business needs question: Under what circumstances should a redemp-
tion of corporate stock or the funding of a proposed redemption be con-
sidered a reasonable business need?
The reasonable business needs issue is raised most often in the situa-
tion where a closely held corporation considers redeeming the stock of
its founder or the heirs of its founder.' Such a redemption undeniably re-
dounds to the benefit of the redeemed shareholder. However, the trans-
action also has considerable significance for the corporation in that con-
trol is shifted.' The crucial issue for purposes of the tax on accumulated
earnings is whether the accumulation should be characterized as under-
taken for the corporation's reasonable business needs or for the redeemed
shareholder's tax benefit.
II. THE MECHANISM IMPOSING THE ACCUMULATED EARNINGS TAX
A. In General
Section 532(a) of the Code describes the type of corporation upon
which the tax will fall. It is to be imposed upon every corporation "formed
or availed of for the purpose of avoiding the income tax with respect to
its shareholders or the shareholders of any other corporation, by per-
mitting earnings and profits to accumulate instead of being divided or
distributed."5 Thus, two elements must exist if the corporation is to be
assessed: 1) it must have permitted its earnings and profits to ac-
cumulate; and 2) it must have done so with the intent of avoiding income
tax with respect to its shareholders. These elements are often referred
' Few publicly owned companies have ever been confronted with an assess-
ment of the tax, and then only where control can be ascribed to a handful of in-
siders. See Golconda Mining Corp. v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 139 (1972), rev'd, 507
F.2d 594 (9th Cir. 1974); Trico Prods. Corp. v. Commissioner, 46 B.T.A. 346 (1942),
affd, 137 F.2d 424 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 799 (1943). See also Trico Prods.
Corp. v. McGowan, 67 F. Supp. 311 (W.D.N.Y. 1946), affl'd, 169 F.2d 343 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 335 U.S. 899 (1948).
' These types of corporate stock repurchases are favored under the Internal
Revenue Code by yielding capital gains treatment under certain circumstances
for the redeemed shareholders. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 302. In the case of a deceased
shareholder, however, such capital gains treatment is limited to the extent it
does not exceed the sum of the estate, inheritance, legacy and succession taxes,
and the funeral and administration expenses. Id § 303. See notes 100-08 infra and
accompanying text.
' I.R.C. § 532(a). But see I.R.C. § 532(b), which sets forth certain exceptions to
the general rule described, e.g., personal holding companies. Such exceptions are
not pertinent to this article.
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to as the "proscribed conduct" and the "proscribed purpose," respec-
tively.'
B. The Intent Factor and Objectifying the State of Mind
To measure the existence of the proscribed purpose, the state of mind
of the corporate taxpayer must be gauged. It has been observed that a
motive cannot accurately be attributed to a corporation; the state of
mind must be measured with respect to those individuals in control.
7
Because subjective intent is difficult to establish, certain presumptions
from which the proscribed purpose can be inferred have always been in-
cluded in the statutory scheme.'
The most important presumption for purposes of the present discus-
sion is that if earnings and profits are permitted to accumulate beyond
the reasonable needs of the business, the existence of that fact will "be
determinative of the purpose to avoid the income tax with respect to
shareholders, unless the corporation by preponderance of the evidence
shall prove to the contrary."9
6 For similar analyses, see American Trading & Prod. Corp. v. United States,
362 F. Supp. 801 (D. Md. 1972), aff'd mem., 474 F.2d 1341 (4th Cir. 1973); GPD, Inc.
v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 480 (1973), rev'd, 508 F.2d 1076 (6th Cir. 1974).
Casey v. Commissioner, 267 F.2d 26, 32 (2d Cir. 1959) (Hand, J., concurring);
KOMA, Inc. v. Commissioner, 8 T.C.M. (CCH) 1064, 1070-71 (1949), affl'd, 189 F.2d
390 (10th Cir. 1951). See Herwitz, supra note 1, at 869.
' See 7 MERTENS, Presumptions with Respect to Avoidance, L. FED. INCOME
TAX. § 39.28 (1976). See also Stanton v. Commissioner, 44 B.T.A. 56 (1941), aff'd,
138 F.2d 512 (1943) (per curiam); DeMille v. Commissioner, 31 B.T.A. 1161 (1935),
aff'd, 90 F.2d 12 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 713 (1937).
The United States Supreme Court had this observation on the presumptions
of the accumulated earnings tax: "As Judge Learned Hand said of the much
weaker presumption contained in the Revenue Act of 1921, § 220, 42 Stat. 247, 'Ia]
statute which stands on the footing of the participants' state of mind may need
the support of presumption, indeed be practically unenforceable without it ....'
United States v. Donruss Co., 393 U.S. 297, 308 (1969) (quoting United Business
Corp. v. Commissioner, 62 F.2d 754, 755 (2d Cir. 1933)). The Court continued,
"'(tjhe utility of... [that] presumption.., is well nigh destroyed if... [it] is saddled
with requirement of proof of "the primary or dominant purpose" of the accumula-
tion."' Id. (quoting Barrow Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 294 F.2d 79, 82 (5th Cir.
1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 817 (1962)).
' I.R.C. § 533(a). The strength of this presumption should not be
underestimated. For example, another presumption used in the accumulated earn-
ings tax is that if a corporation is a mere holding or investment company, that
fact shall be "prima facie evidence of the purpose to avoid the income tax with
respect to shareholders." Id § 533(b). Comparing the former presumption with
the latter, the former is "determinative" of the proscribed purpose while the lat-
ter is merely "prima facie evidence." Hence, the presumption contained in section
533(a) is accorded even greater weight than that which usually attaches to a
determination made by the Commissioner. See Herwitz, supra note 1, at 870-72; 7
MERTENS, supra note 8, Unreasonable Accumulation of Earnings and Profits
Determinative of Purpose at § 39.29.
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The Treasury Regulations indicate that the existence or nonexistence
of the purpose to avoid income tax with respect to shareholders, ie., the
proscribed purpose, may be proven by circumstances other than those
specified in section 533."o However, as a practical matter, litigation has
centered upon the "reasonable business needs" issue. Once assessed,
avoidance of the tax almost always depends upon justification by the
taxpayer of the accumulations in terms of the reasonable needs of the
corporation's business.11
C. The Burden of Proof
The corporate taxpayer has an opportunity to redress the imbalance
created by the statutory presumption by taking advantage of the pro-
cedures set forth in section 534 of the Code. Before mailing a notice of
deficiency, the Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service is re-
quired to send to the taxpayer a separate notice to the effect that the
forthcoming deficiency notice will include an amount attributable to ex-
cessive accumulations of earnings and profits."2 Within sixty days of the
date the section 534 notice is mailed, the taxpayer may respond by sub-
mitting a statement of the grounds upon which it relies to establish that
all or any part of the earnings and profits have not been permitted to ac-
cumulate beyond the reasonable needs of the business.'3 The effect of
the statement is to shift to the Commissioner the burden of proof as to
his/her allegations that the corporation has accumulated excessive earn-
ings and profits."
The burden will be shifted only to the extent that the statement in-
cludes facts sufficient to demonstrate the factual basis of the taxpayer's
allegations. 5 Where the statement is too broad or vague, the burden
10 Treas. Reg. § 1.533-1(a)(2) (1959).
" See, e.g., Smoot Sand & Gravel Corp. v. Commissioner, 241 F.2d 197 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 922 (1957); Gazette Publishing Co. v. Self, 103 F. Supp.
779 (E.D. Ark. 1952); World Publishing Co. v. United States, 104 F. Supp. 784
(N.D. Okla. 1952); Trico Prods. Corp. y. McGowan, 67 F. Supp. 311 (W.D.N.Y.
1946), affd, 169 F.2d 343 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 899 (1948); Breitfeller
Sales, Inc. v. Commissioner, 28 T.C. 1164 (1957); Whitney Chain & Mfg. Co. v.
Commissioner, 3 T.C. 1109 (1944), affd, 149 F.2d 936 (2d Cir. 1945) (per curiam).
12 I.R.C. § 534(b). In the event the Commissioner fails to provide such notice,
the burden of proof on the issue of reasonable business needs will remain on him.
Id § 534(a)(1); Treas. Reg. § 1.534-2 (a)(1) (1959).
's Treas. Reg. § 1.534-2(d)(2) (1959).
1 I.R.C. § 534(a)(2).
" Treas. Reg. § 1.534-2(a)(2) (1959). For the procedure of preparation and mail-
ing of the letter of notification, see Rev. Proc. 56-11, 1956-1 C.B. 1028. For an ex-
ample of a partially unsuccessful section 534 statement, see Shaw-Walker Co. v.
Commissoner, 390 F.2d 205, 217-33 (6th Cir. 1968), vacated, 393 U.S. 478 (1969)
(per curiam).
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will remain with the taxpayer." Accordingly, section 534 statements
should contain estimates of the dollar amounts involved for the par-
ticular business needs set forth.'7 Finally, choice of forum becomes im-
portant in litigating reasonable business needs issues because the sec-
tion 534 procedure is applicable only to complaints filed with the Tax
Court and not to refund claims in the district courts and the Court of
Claims."1
Even if the corporation successfully shifts the burden of proof with
respect to the reasonable business needs issue, it still bears the final
burden of persuasion that the amounts at issue were not accumulated to
facilitate shareholder tax avoidance, i.e., the presence or absence of the
"proscribed purpose".' 9 The elaborate statutory structure clearly in-
dicates the considerable importance Congress attached to allocation of
the burden of proof on the reasonable business needs issue."
D. Determining the Tax Base: Accumulated Taxable Income
and the Accumulated Earnings Credit
Section 535 of the Code defines "accumulated taxable income," the in-
come base against which the tax rates are applied. "Accumulated tax-
"6 Herzog Miniature Lamp Works, Inc. v. Commissioner, 481 F.2d 857 (2d Cir.
1973); R. Gsell & Co. v. Commissioner, 294 F.2d 321 (2d Cir. 1961); Hamabe Realty
Corp. v. Commissioner, 33 T.C.M. (CCH) 1029 (1974); 31 W. 53rd St. Corp. v. Com-
missioner, 33 T.C.M. (CCH) 142 (1974); Powder Mill Realty Trust v. Commis-
sioner, 32 T.C.M. (CCH) 707 (1973); Federal Ornamental Iron & Bronze Co. v.
Commissioner, 28 T.C.M. (CCH) 391 (1969); I. A. Dress Co. v. Commissioner, 32
T.C. 93 (1959), affd on other grounds, 273 F.2d 543 (2d Cir. 1960).
" Bohac Agency, Inc. v. Commissioner, 30 T.C.M. (CCH) 979 (1971). For in-
stances of the taxpayer successfully shifting the burden of proof, see Delaware
Trucking Co. v. Commissioner, 32 T.C.M. (CCH) 105 (1973); Chatham Corp. v.
Commissioner, 48 T.C. 145 (1967); Oman Constr. Co. v. Commissioner, 24 T.C.M.
(CCH) 1799 (1965); Ted Bates & Co. v. Commissioner, 24 T.C.M. (CCH) 1346 (1965);
Vuono-Lione, Inc. v. Commissioner, 24 T.C.M. (CCH) 506 (1965).
" I.R.C. § 534(a). If a taxpayer questions in a federal district court the imposi-
tion of the accumulated earnings tax, there is no procedure for shifting the
burden of proof to the Commissioner regarding the reasonableness of the ac-
cumulation.
" R. Gsell & Co. v. Commissioner, 294 F.2d 321 (2d Cir. 1961); Pelton Steel
Casting Co. v. Commissioner, 251 F.2d 278 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 958
(1958); Powder Mill Realty Trust v. Commissioner, 32 T.C.M. (CCH) 707 (1973);
Cheyenne Newspapers, Inc. v. Commissioner, 32 T.C.M. (CCH) 234 (1973); I. A.
Dress Co. v. Commissioner, 32 T.C. 93 (1959), aff'd on other grounds, 273 F.2d 543
(2d Cir. 1960). For a historical approach to the litigation of the section 534 issue,
see Canty, supra note 1, at 253-58.
, On occasion, however, courts have failed to make a specific finding as to
where in the intricate legal tangle the burden of proof is to be placed. Several
decisions have been handed down based merely upon a consideration of the
record as a whole. See, e.g., Smoot Sand & Gravel Corp. v. Commissioner, 274
F.2d 495 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 976 (1960); McMinn v. Commissioner, 21
T.C.M. (CCH) 913 (1962); Barrow Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 19 T.C.M. (CCH) 195
(1960), aff'd on other grounds, 294 F.2d 79 (5th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S.
817 (1962); Penn Needle Art Co. v. Commissioner, 17 T.C.M. (CCH) 504 (1958).
1979]
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able income" consists of taxable income minus the dividends paid deduc-
tion (as set forth in section 561 and subsequent sections) and the ac-
cumulated earnings credit (as set forth in section 535(c)), with futher ad-
justments." The dividends paid deduction includes the sum of dividends
paid during the taxable year, the consent dividends for the taxable year,
and certain carryover dividends in the case of personal holding com-
panies.2 The rates applied to the "accumulated taxable income" base
are twenty-seven and one-half percent on the first $100,000 of such in-
come and thirty-eight and one-half percent on the excess.
"Accumulated taxable income" should not be confused with the cor-
poration's earnings and profits, the phrase used in the "proscribed pur-
pose" portion of the statute. While there may be a number of items
which are part of both in an accounting sense, the two terms are not
synonymous. Earnings and profits increase from year to year as a part
of corporate growth; accumulated taxable income is the taxable base
upon which the tax is imposed if the accumulation of earnings and pro-
fits is for the proscribed purpose. In a given year it would be possible
for a corporation to have accumulated taxable income and incur liability
for the penalty tax despite a decrease in the earnings and profits ac-
count.23
The accumulated earnings credit was a response on the part of Con-
gress to complaints that the accumulated earnings tax was imposed on
an "all or nothing" basis which could result in extensive tax liability as a
result of a few dollars in excessive accumulations. 4 For a corporation
that is not a mere holding or investment company the accumulated earn-
ings credit is an amount equal to such part of its earnings and profits for
the taxable year in question which are retained "for the reasonable
needs of the business" minus the deduction allowed by section 535(b)(6),
relating to the excess of net long-term capital gain over net short-term
capital loss.5 If the general credit as computed above is less than
$150,000, an alternative minimum credit contained in the statute may
result in a larger credit amount for the taxpayer. This alternative
minimum credit is ascertained by subtracting from $150,000 the ac-
I1 I.R.C. § 535(a).
Treas. Reg. § 1.561-1, T.D. 6598, 1962-1 C.B. 92, 127.
An increase in earnings and profits during the taxable year in which the ac-
cumulated earnings tax is levied is not necessary. Despite what may appear to be
clear statutory language requiring an "accumulation," it has been held that Con-
gress never intended this to be a pre-condition to imposition of the tax. GPD, Inc.
v. Commissioner, 508 F.2d 1076 (6th Cir. 1974); Ostendorf-Morris Co. v. United
States, 70-2 U.S.T.C. 9550, 26 A.F.T.R. 2d 70-5369 (N.D. Ohio 1968). See
Rudolph, supra note 1, at 112-20.
2 Canty, supra note 1, at 258-61; 7 MERTENS, supra note 8, General at § 39.25.
I.R.C. § 535(c)(1).
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cumulated earnings and profits of the corporation as of the close of the
preceeding taxable year."6 For the purposes of this minimum credit, the
accumulated earnings and profits are reduced by the dividends which
are considered as having been paid during the taxable year. 7 The net ef-
fect of this two-tiered credit system is to allow a corporation to ac-
cumulate its first $150,000 of earnings and profits without fear of run-
ning afoul of the unreasonable accumulations tax.
It can be seen that the reasonable business needs test is incorporated
into the statutory scheme at two distinct points. First, it is a concept
employed in arriving at a determination, by means of the statutory
presumption, as to the existence of the proscribed purpose. Second,
upon a finding of a proscribed purpose, accumulations for reasonable
business needs act as a means by which the accumulated earnings credit
may be increased so as to decrease the amount of tax assessed.28
E. Business Needs Deemed Reasonable by Statute
Section 537 of the Code lists three items which are deemed to fall
within the "reasonable needs of the business" rubric: 1) the reasonably
anticipated needs of the business; 2) redemptions in connection with sec-
tion 303 relating to payment of a deceased shareholder's estate taxes
and other qualifying expenses; and 3) redemptions of stock from a
private foundation which, if it remained in the hands of the foundation,
would constitute excess business holdings."
The concept of "anticipated needs" was promulgated to counter an
earlier judicial rule that only the immediate needs of the business would
Id. § 535(c)(2).
Id § 535(c)(4).
Presumably, the reasonable business needs test ought to be identical at
both points it appears in the scheme of taxation, although at least one commen-
tator feels that it is applied differently. See Canty, supra note 1, at 264-70. See
also notes 93-94 infra and accompanying text. In any event, it is interesting to
note that the situation may exist where the tax is found to be rightly imposed
but the accumulated taxable income is zero because of the accumulated earnings
credit. It may be for this reason that certain courts have taken the approach of
merely addressing the reasonable business needs issue. See, e.g., Harrison Bolt &
Nut Co. v. United States, 64-2 U.S.T.C. 1 9631, 14 A.F.T.R. 2d 5360 (D. Md. 1964);
Duke Laboratories, Inc. v. United States, 222 F. Supp. 400 (D. Conn. 1963), aff'd,
337 F.2d 280 (2d Cir. 1964); Hattiesburg Compress Co. v. United States, 60-2
U.S.T.C. 9.552, 6 A.F.T.R. 2d 5012 (S.D. Miss. 1960); Freedom Newspapers, Inc.
v. Commissioner, 24 T.C.M. (CCH) 1327 (1965); John P. Scripps Newspapers v.
Commissioner, 44 T.C. 453 (1965); Vuono-Lione, Inc. v. Commissioner, 24 T.C.M.
(CCH) 506 (1965); Fotocrafters, Inc. v. Commissioner, 19 T.C.M. (CCH) 1401 (1960).
" See Treas. Reg. § 1.537-1 (1972). The one section not examined in this
outline of the mechanism governing the tax is section 536. Simply, it states that
accumulated taxable income for a taxable year consisting of less than twelve
months shall not be placed on an annual basis for the purpose of applying section
531.
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be deemed reasonable." The Treasury Regulations now state that "an
accumulation need not be used immediately, nor must the plans for its
use be consummated within a short period after the close of the taxable
year, provided that such accumulation will be used within a reasonable
time depending upon all the facts and circumstances relating to the
future needs of the business."31 However, where such future needs are
uncertain or vague or the stated purpose of an accumulation for future
use is not specific, definite and feasible, then the need will not be deemed
to justify the accumulation.2
The Tax Reform Act of 1969 specifically approved the two types of
redemption transactions in section 537.3 Significantly, there is absolutely
no indication in the legislative history that these are the only types of
redemptions that would constitute reasonable business needs.3 4 Since
the accumulated earnings tax is a penalty tax, it should be strictly con-
strued.35 Accordingly, absent any indication by Congress that sections
537(a)(2) and (3) were intended to be exclusive, those provisions should
be construed to allow other redemption transactions given favorable
treatment under other sections of the Code to occur without concern
that the funding of those transactions would lead to a section 531 tax.
III. SELECTIVE LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL HISTORY
A selective legislative and judicial history will be helpful in highlight-
ing whether redemptions not included in sections 537(a)(2) and (3) should
See McCutchin Drilling Co. v. Commissioner, 143 F.2d 480 (5th Cir. 1944); J.
M. Perry & Co. v. Commissioner, 120 F.2d 123 (9th Cir. 1941); World Publishing
Co. v. United States, 72 F. Supp. 886 (N.D. Okla. 1947), aff'd, 169 F.2d 186 (10th
Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 911 (1949); Gus Blass Co. v. Commissioner, 9 T.C.
15 (1947), appeal dismissed, 168 F.2d 833 (8th Cir. 1948); Wilkerson Daily Corp. v.
Commissioner, 42 B.T.A. 1266 (1940), affl'd, 125 F.2d 998 (9th Cir. 1942).
31 Treas. Reg. § 1.537-1(b)(1), T.D. 7165, 1972-1 C.B. 167. See S. REP. No. 1622,
83d Cong., 2d Sess. 318 (1954).
, Smoot Sand & Gravel Corp. v. Commissioner, 274 F.2d 495 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 362 U.S. 976 (1960); Wilcox Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 38 T.C.M. (CCH)
378 (1979); Faber Cement Block Co. v. Commissioner, 50 T.C. 317 (1968), acq.,
1968-2 C.B. 2; Treas. Reg. § 1.537-1(b)(1), T.D. 7165, 1972-1 C.B. 167. For those tax-
able years beginning after September 30, 1979, "reasonably anticipated" needs
will include "reasonably anticipated product liability losses." I.R.C. § 537(b)(4).
This provision, added by the Revenue Act of 1978, was intended to allow tax-
payers to accumulate for product liability self-insurance needs. Pub. L. No.
95-600, § 371, 92 Stat. 2763, 2859 (1978). In determining the amounts properly at-
tributable to a product liability loss reserve, the taxpayer's product liability ex-
perience, extent of commercial insurance coverage, and deductibility of actual
product liability losses suffered will be taken into account. H.R. REP. No. 1800,
95th Cong., 2d Sess. 189 (1978), reprinted in [19781 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
6761, 7198.
Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 906, 83 Stat. 487, 714 (1969).
' See S. REP. No. 552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 115 (1969), reprinted in [1969] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1645, 2027.
' Ivan Allen Co. v. United States, 422 U.S. 617, 627 (1975); Commissioner v.
Acker, 361 U.S. 87, 91 (1959).
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be considered reasonable business needs of the corporation. The early
history of the tax is a story unto itself successfully recounted in depth
by others."6 Briefly, the accumulated earnings tax originated with the
Tariff Act of 1913, the first personal income tax statute following the
ratification of the sixteenth amendment. 7 The act imposed the tax not
upon the corporate entity but upon shareholders of any corporation
"formed or fraudulently availed of" for shareholder tax avoidance by
permitting gains and profits to accumulate instead of being divided or
distributed. Imposition of the tax required that each shareholder in-
clude his pro-rata share of the gains and profits of the corporation in his
taxable income. 8
The first major change in the tax was made in 1918. The word "fraud-
ulently" was dropped from the statute because of the difficulties involved
in the application of the tax.39 The statute underwent another significant
transformation when the tax was shifted from the shareholder to the
corporation by the Revenue Act of 1921.40
There was discussion concerning further amendment of the tax upon
passage of both the Revenue Acts of 1926 and 1928, but no substantial
change was enacted. During this period the tax was not often imposed,
and some still considered it ineffective in forcing corporate distribu-
tions. 1 In 1934, Congress dealt with the obvious deficiencies concerning
personal holding companies and at the same time gave corporations the
right to deduct dividends paid to their shareholders from "adjusted net
income," the forerunner of "accumulated taxable income.""2
To silence complaints that the tax was still not achieving its purpose
of compelling distributions, Congress amended the subsection dealing
with the reasonable business needs presumption.'3 Formerly, if earnings
and profits accumulated beyond the reasonable needs of the business,
' See Canty, supra note 1, at 244-62; Herwitz, supra note 1, at 866-86.
3' Tariff Act of 1913, ch. 16, § 657, 38 Stat. 114, 166 (1913).
" See S. REP. No. 617, 65th Cong., 3d Sess. 1 (1918); H.R. REP. No. 350, 67th
Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1921).
" Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 220, 40 Stat. 1057, 1072 (1919). See S. REP.
No. 617, 65th Cong., 3d Sess. 1 (1918).
," Ch. 136, § 220, 42 Stat. 227, 247 (1921). This change was prompted by cer-
tain doubts which arose after the decision of Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189
(1920). See H.R. REP. No. 350, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1921).
"1 See E. GRISWOLD, CASES & MATERIALS ON FEDERAL TAXATION 951 (6th ed.
1966).
42 Revenue Act of 1934, ch. 277, §§ 102, 351, 48 Stat. 680, 702, 751 (1934). See
S. REP. No. 558, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1934); H.R. REP. No. 704, 73d Cong., 2d
Sess. 14 (1934). The Revenue Act of 1936 substituted for the phrase "gains and
profits" the now familiar phrase "earnings and profits." Ch. 690, § 102, 49 Stat.
1648, 1676 (1936). Despite this change in the statute, it is doubtful that the mean-
ing of the phrase changed. See S. REP. No. 2156, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1936).
43 See Herwitz, supra note 1, at 870-71.
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such accumulation was prima facie evidence of the corporation's intent
to avoid a tax upon its shareholders. This merely shifted to the taxpayer
the burden of going forward with the evidence. The amendment made
such an accumulation "determinative" of the existence of the proscribed
purpose and placed the burden upon the taxpayer to show the lack of
such intent "by a clear preponderance of the evidence.""
From 1938 to 1954 the tax remained virtually unchanged, although
some dissatisfaction with enforcement remained and discussions propos-
ing remedies were occasionally still advanced." Nonetheless, the
reforms occasioned by the reenactment of the 1939 Code were favorable
to the taxpayer. Those reforms included dropping the word "clear" from
the phrase "clear preponderance of the evidence" in section 533, the ad-
dition of the section 534 statement giving the taxpayer the opportunity
to shift the burden of proof on the reasonable needs issue, and the pro-
mulgation of the accumulated earnings credit of section 535. Later, with
the 1954 reenactment of the Code, section 537 was added, specifying
that reasonable business needs included reasonably anticipated business
needs.'" In 1969 the winds continued to blow the way of the taxpayer, as
the two specific redemption items deemed to be reasonable business
needs were added to section 537.47 The only legislative changes since
1969 have been to increase the alternative minimum credit to its pre-
sent $150,000 and to permit the inclusion of "reasonably anticipated pro-
duct liability losses" in the determination of the "reasonably anticipated
needs of the business" pursuant to section 537.48
There were few judicial interpretations of the accumulated earnings
tax provisions in the 1920s and 1930s."9 The first benchmark was Cecile
B. DeMille v. Commissioner,5 involving the famous motion picture pro-
ducer. In that case, the Board of Tax Appeals set the focus for the
future of the tax, emphasizing that it was "the purpose, the intention
" Revenue Act of 1938, ch. 289, § 102, 52 Stat. 447, 483 (1938). See S. REP. No.
1567, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 12 (1938). It was hoped that this amendment would
facilitate enforcement in that Congress was concerned at the time with the "in-
corporated pocketbook."
'- See E. GRISWOLD, supra note 41, at 951.
,6 S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 318 (1954).
'" Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 906, 83 Stat. 487, 714 (1969).
See S. REP. No. 552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 115, reprinted in [1969] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 1645, 2027.
" Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 371, 92 Stat. 2763, 2859 (1978),
amending I.R.C. § 537(b); Tax Reduction Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-12, § 304(a),
89 Stat. 26, 45 amending I.R.C. § 535(c)(2), (c)(3).
49 E. GRISWOLD, supra note 41, at 951-52; Canty, supra note 1, at 246.
10 31 B.T.A. 1161 (1935), aff'd, 90 F.2d 12 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 713
(1937). In what was an extensive review of case law to the date of the case, the
decision mentioned only six other cases. See note 3 supra and cases cited therein.
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motivating a course of conduct"51 which was controlling. Thus the court
held in favor of the taxpayer that a corporation succeeding a partner-
ship which produced motion pictures was not formed or availed of for
the purpose of avoiding taxes with respect to its shareholders. Accord-
ingly, later decisions engaged in much speculation as to the "state of
mind" of those in control of the corporate taxpayer. 2
The first United States Supreme Court decision involving the tax
upheld its constitutionality under the sixteenth amendment.53 In answer
to the argument that the tax was a penalty upon one's thoughts, the
Court observed that the proscribed purpose was merely a condition
precedent to the imposition of the tax and that this was not unusual in
determining tax consequences." The Court went on to hold that the pro-
scribed purpose was present, carefully noting that the evidence was suf-
ficient to reach this conclusion independently of the statutory presump-
tion regarding reasonable business needs.55
The Supreme Court's next encounter with the tax was Helvering v.
Chicago Stock Yards Co.51 In a battle for control of the midwest meat
packing industry, a renowned entrepreneur, Frederick Prince, formed a
New Jersey corporation for the purpose of gaining control of competing
stock yards. His goal was to improve his bargaining position with the
meat packers. Unsuccessful in his attempt to control the market, he
finally decided to align himself with the largest packer, Armour & Com-
pany. To that end Prince formed with Armour a second corporation (the
taxpayer in the case) with the intention of buying out the original New
Jersey corporation. However, Armour subsequently was required under
a separate antitrust proceeding to divest itself of its interest in the newly
formed corporation, leaving Prince as its sole shareholder. The Supreme
Court, reversing the circuit court and upholding the Board of Tax Ap-
peals, concluded that the corporate taxpayer had been availed of for the
purpose of avoiding income tax with respect to its sole shareholder.
In reaching this conclusion, the Court scrutinized the justification for
the accumulation advanced by the taxpayer-that the New Jersey cor-
porate charter was to expire in 1940 and that it had "what it deemed a
moral, and, indeed, a legal obligation to pay off the mortgage debts of
5' 31 B.T.A. at 1174 (emphasis in original). However, the Board did also state
that "[a]dmittedly, circumstances may evidence a purpose ...." Id.
' See Holzman, Don't Let the Corporation's "State of Mind" Trap It in Sec-
tion 531 Cases, 6 J. TAX. 348 (1957); Otto, Section 102: The Tax on a Corporation's
Psyche, 31 TAXES 432 (1953).
Helvering v. National Grocery Co., 304 U.S. 282 (1938).
Id. at 289. Many taxes which depend upon the taxpayer's state of mind are
still with us. E.g., I.R.C. § 165(c) (intention to enter a transaction for profit as a
pre-condition to loss deduction); id. § 2511 (donative intent respecting gifts).
5 304 U.S. at 294.
51 318 U.S. 693 (1943).
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the New Jersey company and its subsidiaries and to redeem its outstand-
ing stock."'57 The Court responded by noting that the same result could
have been achieved by Prince himself if the corporate taxpayer's earn-
ings and profits had been distributed to him. Further, the New Jersey
corporate charter could have been renewed. The existence of these
alternatives to the proposed redemption was held to show that it was
not a reasonable need of the business. To date, this decision represents
the only comment by the highest court on the accumulated earnings tax
in connection with a redemption.5
The next word from the Supreme Court involving the accumulated
earnings tax came in 1969. In United States v. Donruss Co., 59 the Court
was asked to resolve a split among the circuit courts of appeals over the
precise meaning of the proscribed purpose standard. Certain circuits
had taken the position that the motive to avoid a tax upon the
shareholders must be the dominant, controlling or impelling motive. 0
Others had rejected that standard and were willing to impose the penalty
tax where the proscribed purpose could be said to be one of the motives
prompting the accumulations." Still other circuits held to an in-
termediate position stating that the proscribed purpose must be a
"determining purpose.""2 The Court, after reviewing the legislative
history, decided that the motive need only be one of many for the tax to
be properly imposed.13
It is crucial to note that this case was not a reasonable business needs
case; it was a proscribed purpose case. The Court expressly pointed out
that it did not intimate an opinion about the standards governing
reasonableness of corporate accumulations." The Court's care in
57 Id. at 701.
The Supreme Court, however, used the word "redeem" in a non-technical
sense since the New Jersey corporation was purchasing the stock of an unrelated
corporation and not its own stock. See notes 93-100 infra and accompanying text.
9 393 U.S. 297 (1969).
60 Apollo Indus., Inc. v. Commissioner, 358 F.2d 867 (1st Cir. 1966); Young
Motor Co. v. Commissioner, 281 F.2d 488 (1st Cir. 1960).
"1 United States v. Duke Laboratories, Inc., 337 F.2d 280 (2d Cir. 1964); Bar-
row Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 294 F.2d 79 (5th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S.
817 (1962); Trico Prods. Corp. v. Commissioner, 137 F.2d 424 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 320 U.S. 799 (1943).
" Kerr-Cochran, Inc. v. Commissioner, 253 F.2d 121 (8th Cir. 1958); World
Publishing Co. v. United States, 169 F.2d 186 (10th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 335
U.S. 911 (1949).
393 U.S. at 303.
Id. at 301. Recognizing the important difference between inquiries into
reasonable business needs and those into the existence of the proscribed purpose,
the Supreme Court stated:
It appears to us that the congressional response to these facts had been
to emphasize unreasonable accumulation as to the most significant factor
in the incidence of the tax. The reasonableness of an accumulation, while
[Vol. 28:417
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distinguishing between the two issues supports an analysis regarding
the reasonable business needs inquiry as separate and distinct from any
consideration of shareholder tax advantage. After this decision it is im-
perative that the taxpayer prove his reasonable business needs to
escape the penalty tax, since failure to justify the accumulation in this
manner relegates the taxpayer to the difficult position of proving by a
preponderance of the evidence that thoughts of a tax savings never in-
fluenced its decision not to distribute. In fact, suspicions could be raised
from the taxpayer's mere knowledge that a tax savings to shareholders
would result from a failure to distribute. 5
IV. WHAT IS A REASONABLE BUSINESS NEED?
A. "Reasonable"
Before deciding whether a redemption can be a reasonable business
need, the concept of "reasonable business needs" must be analyzed.
Some precepts in this area are axiomatic: a reasonable business need is
always a question of fact." Each case presents a unique situation so that
what may be a reasonable business need in one instance is not
reasonable in another."
First, only those needs which are seen as reasonable will meet the
statutory mandate. Accordingly, more than a subjective belief is re-
quired in that there must be a demonstration of reasonableness which
can be appreciated by others viewing the situation. While
management's business judgment should not be second-guessed on the
basis of hindsight, the facts and circumstances existing at the time must
subject to honest difference of opinion, is a much more objective inquiry,
and is susceptible of more effective scrutiny, than are the vagaries of
corporate motive.
Id at 307.
" The Supreme Court did remark that knowledge of a tax savings would not
be sufficient to impose the tax. But, as has been pointed out, it is difficult for a
shareholder-officer of a corporation to prove he was not motivated by that
thought which he knew to be for his benefit. Id. at 311-12 (Harlan, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part). See JJJ Corp. v. United States, 576 F.2d 327, 346
(Ct. Cl. 1978); John B. Lambert & Assoc. v. United States, 212 Ct. Cl. 71, 85 (1976).
' E.g., American Metal Prods. Corp. v. Commissioner, 287 F.2d 860 (8th Cir.
1961); Battlestein Invs. Co. v. United States, 302 F. Supp. 320 (S.D. Tex. 1969),
affd, 442 F.2d 87 (5th Cir. 1971); Dickman Lumber Co. v. United States, 65-1
U.S.T.C. 9133, 15 A.F.T.R. 2d 027 (W.D. Wash. 1964), affd, 355 F.2d 670 (9th Cir.
1966); James M. Pierce Corp. v. Commissioner, 38 T.C. 643 (1962), aff'd in part
and rev'd in part on other grounds, 326 F.2d 67 (8th Cir. 1964); F. E. Watkins
Motor Co. v. Commissioner, 31 T.C. 288 (1958).
67 E.g., Sears Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 359 F.2d 191 (2d Cir. 1966); Wilkerson
Daily Corp. v. Commissioner, 42 B.T.A. 1266 (1940), aff'd, 125 F.2d 998 (9th Cir.
1942); William C. DeMille Prods., Inc. v. Commissioner, 30 B.T.A. 826 (1934).
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show that the need could be clothed with a certain amount of
reasonableness. 8
B. "Business"
The need must be a business need. The word used by the statute is
"business" alone, not "trade or business" as used in other Code
sections. 9 No definition of "business" as such is given in either the
statute or the Treasury Regulations, although the regulations state that
the business of a corporation is not merely that in which it has previously
engaged but includes any line of business which it may undertake."0 The
primary focus appears to be on the operational aspect of the corpora-
tion's life, i.e., its product and those things associated with putting that
product on the market. Strictly speaking, a redemption is not related to
this end. However, since certain redemptions satisfy reasonable
business needs,71 the word "business" should be construed in a broader
sense to include all activities related to the corporation's life regardless
of direct connection to operational activities. This broader interpreta-
tion has been generally accepted. 2
The area in which the courts have most often recognized a need to
delimit precisely the business needs concept is in its relationship to
shareholders' needs. If the corporate taxpayer loses sight of the require-
ment that accumulations must be used to meet the needs of its business
and not to provide for the various exigencies of its shareholders, the tax
will properly be imposed.
73
The "business needs" versus "shareholder needs" distinction must be
E.g., Bremerton Sun Publishing Co. v. Commissioner, 44 T.C. 566 (1965);
John P. Scripps Newspapers v. Commissioner, 44 T.C. 453 (1965); Breitfeller
Sales, Inc. v. Commissioner, 28 T.C. 1164 (1957); Crawford County Printing &
Publishing Co. v. Commissioner, 17 T.C. 1404 (1952), acq., 1955-1 C.B. 4.
69 E.g., I.R.C. § 162(a); id. § 1231(b).
70 Treas. Reg. § 1.537-3(a), 26 C.F.R. § 1.537-3(a) (1979).
7 I.R.C. § 537(a)(2), (a)(3).
72 E.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.537-3(b), 26 C.F.R. § 1.537-3(b) (1979) (earnings and pro-
fits may be put to use in a second corporation if a parent-subsidiary relationship
exists). However, in an early decision, the Board of Tax Appeals found that ac-
cumulations were not for reasonable business needs where the corporation's
president testified: "If you bring that word 'business' down merely, down to the
operation of a manufacturing plant, there might be some question as to what
more money was needed, but we consider the business, the enterprise, an enter-
prise involving the interests of stockholders who had a contract to release
stock *** ." Trico Prods. Corp. v. Commissioner, 46 B.T.A. 346, 377 (1942), aff'd,
137 F.2d 424 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 799 (1943).
71 JjJ Corp. v. United States, 576 F.2d 327 (Ct. Cl. 1978); Cadillac Textiles,
Inc. v. Commissioner, 34 T.C.M. (CCH) 295 (1975); Kirlin Co. v. Commissioner, 23
T.C.M. (CCH) 1580 (1964), aff'd, 361 F.2d 818 (6th Cir. 1966) (per curiam). See also
Ted Bates & Co. v. Commissioner, 24 T.C.M. (CCH) 1346 (1965) (petitioners
demonstrated corporate need for redemption).
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drawn in considering whether a redemption should trigger the penalty
tax. However, it is crucial to remember that a redeemed shareholder
will likely have a tax benefit from a redemption by virtue of the
redemption's probable treatment as a capital gain.74 Since every
redemption qualifying for capital gains treatment will have an element
of shareholder benefit, the fact of shareholder tax savings only tells, at
best, part of the story. It follows that the presence or absence of a
motive affirmatively tied to the business needs of the corporation,
regardless of the accompanying shareholder tax consequences, is the
proper focus of the section 533(a) presumption phase of the determina-
tion."5
Judicial recognition of the distinction between shareholder and cor-
porate needs finds its roots in two Tax Court cases of the late 1950s."8
The more well-known of the two is Pelton Steel Casting Co. v. Commis-
sioner.77 In Pelton the stockholdings were divided between three men,
two of whom owned a combined interest of eighty percent. These two
were considering the sale of their interests to outsiders. The third
shareholder desired to remain in the business and to avoid taking on
outside investors. Instead of selling, the two departing shareholders
reached agreement with the third to have their shares redeemed. The
agreement was reached in November of 1946; the Commissioner assessed
an accumulated earnings tax for the fiscal years ending November 30,
1945 and November 30, 1946. The corporate taxpayer argued that a cer-
tain amount of the accumulation was necessary to fund the expected
redemption which became a reality within that period. Under the 1939
predecessor to section 532, the Tax Court found that the taxpayer's
shareholders had availed themselves of the corporation for the purpose
of avoiding income taxes by permitting earnings and profits to ac-
cumulate instead of being distributed." The decision thus rested upon a
finding of the existence of the proscribed purpose; the reasonable
business needs presumption was simply bypassed.
That the court did not rely on the reasonable business needs
presumption is made clear by its discussion of the effect of what were
then new additions to the Code. The option to shift the burden of proof
on the business needs issue through the submission of a section 534 state-
7, See notes 94-99 infra and accompanying text.
7 See Rudolph, supra note 1, at 108 n.35. See also notes 85-86 infra and ac-
companying text.
7 Pelton Steel Casting Co. v. Commissioner, 28 T.C. 153 (1957), aff'd, 251 F.2d
278 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 958 (1958); Hedberg-Freidheim Contracting
Co. v. Commissioner, 15 T.C.M. (CCH) 1433 (1956), aff'd, 251 F.2d 839 (8th Cir.
1958).
7 28 T.C. 153 (1957), aff'd, 251 F.2d 278 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 958
(1958).
78 28 T.C. at 185.
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ment was made available retroactively to taxpayers with the result that
the taxpayer in Pelton was able to take advantage of the option even
though the case was decided under the 1939 Code. The Tax Court, forced
to comment on the effect of the statement, ruled that even if the section
534 statement shifted the burden of proof with respect to reasonable
business needs, the outcome would be the same since the proscribed
purpose was found to exist on the basis of the record as a whole and not
as a result of the reasonable business needs presumption." Section 534
does not alter the burden of proving the absence of the proscribed pur-
pose.O
Despite the Tax Court's pinpointing of the proscribed purpose as the
reason for applying the penalty tax, Pelton has sometimes been inter-
preted as holding that accumulations serving shareholder purposes will
not be found to meet the reasonable business needs test.8 This inter-
pretation confuses two independent concepts. Nevertheless, under
Donruss, a finding of any tax avoidance purpose triggers the tax
without reference to the reasonable business needs presumption of sec-
tion 533(a). Accordingly, assuming the correctness of the Pelton court's
finding with respect to the ultimate issue of corporate intent, Pelton is
correctly decided under Donruss.
Under that type of analysis, however, the problem of defining
"reasonable business needs" does not arise. For example, where the
shares of an individual who has had power to influence the corporation's
dividend policy are redeemed in the face of a poor past record of
dividends, the motivating purpose of the accumulation used to fund the
redemption may be directly scrutinized. If the proscribed purpose is
found to be one of the motivating factors on the basis of that direct
scrutiny, the corporation will be liable for the tax. Of course, resolving
the factual question will often be difficult because the proscribed pur-
pose inquiry is inherently subjective. If, on the other hand, recourse is
had to the section 533(a) presumption, shareholder tax savings or other
benefits become simply irrelevant. Either the intended disposition of
the accumulated funds can be justified in terms of the corporation's
business needs or it cannot. The fact of a shareholder tax saving does
not imply that the transaction will not also fulfill a business need.
An interpretation of the reasonable business needs test of section
533(a) that insists on separating the business needs and shareholder
benefit inquiries is in accord with the recognized role of presumptions in
the law of evidence. Presumptions are devices allowing "shortcuts" in
Id at 174 n.6.
Id at 183-84.
Ready Paving & Constr. Co. v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 826 (1974); Nodell
Motors, Inc. v. Commissioner, 26 T.C.M. (CCH) 1027 (1967); Youngs Rubber Corp.
v. Commissioner, 21 T.C.M. (CCH) 1593 (1962), aff'd, 331 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1964) (per
curiam). See Altman, supra note 1, at 830; Kahn, supra note 1, at 820.
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proof. A presumptive fact is deemed "proved" by proof of the basic
fact.2 The business needs presumption was added to the framework of
the accumulated earnings tax as a "shortcut" around the problem of prov-
ing that the corporate taxpayer "intended" a certain result.13 In pursu-
ing subjective inquiry into shareholder's motives (which are relevant to
the presumptive fact of the existence of the proscribed purpose and not
to the basic fact of whether the needs for which the taxpayer ac-
cumulated earnings were reasonable business needs), courts widen the
scope of inquiry that Congress intentionally narrowed by adding the
presumption.
In the proscribed purpose inquiry, where the presumption does not
apply, shareholder purpose and corporate purpose can only be balanced
subjectively. A choice therefore had to be made in Donruss whether any
shareholder benefit at this level tainted the reason for the accumulation.
Yet Donruss also expressly recognized that the reasonable business
needs test of the presumption is, in contrast, an objective test. The
"state of mind" problem is thus simply inapplicable to the business
needs inquiry." The existence of a shareholder benefit need not dis-
qualify an otherwise reasonable business need from being a proper ex-
planation for an accumulation. 5 Some practioners have added to the
courts' confusion by not stressing business needs in redemption situa-
tions."
Presumptions have been describdd as:
involv[ing] a relationship between one fact or set of facts-the basic
fact(s)-and another fact or set of facts-the presumed fact(s). Basic
facts imply presumed facts, the strength of the implication varying with
the presumption. Where a presumption exists, certain advantages usually
accrue to a party proving the basic fact which would not accrue absent
the presumption. The degree of advantage depends upon the sense in
which the term "presumption" is used.
R. LEMPERT & S. SALTZBURG, A MODERN APPROACH TO EVIDENCE 882 (1977).
See notes 7-10 supra and accompanying text.
See authorities cited in note 66 supra.
Further, practical considerations militate against sorting of business and
non-business needs on this basis:
[A]ny attempt to differentiate between corporate objectives and
shareholder objectives in the area of close corporations is likely to prove
futile. Such "incorporated partnerships," toward which the accumulated
earnings tax is primarily directed, do not have any purposes or objec-
tives completely independent of those of their stockholders. Moreover, a
close corporation often represents far more than a mere incorporated
venture to its proprietors. It may well constitute their life's work, and
the foundation of their planning for the present and future security of
their families. It is in this latter connection that redemption transac-
tions, particularly pursuant to stock-restrictions agreements, so often
play a key role.
Herwitz, supra note 1, at 918.
" See, e.g., Dickman Lumber Co. v. United States, 65-1 U.S.T.C. 9133, 15
A.F.T.R. 2d 027 (W.D. Wash. 1964), aff'd, 355 F.2d 670 (9th Cir. 1966); Faber
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C. "Need"
Having considered the words reasonable and business, the last prob-
lem is the word need. "Need" has many connotations, one of which is
urgency." In part, this is the factor which prompted the early "im-
mediacy" test in applying the penalty tax statute."8 The response by
Congress to this narrow interpretation was to add section 537, which
provided that the "reasonable needs of the business" shall include the
"reasonably anticipated" needs of the business as well. The effect of this
addition is to add a component of prudent business planning which may
stretch over a series of years. 9
D. The Final Framework
Even if the ambiguities and problems of interpretation posed by the
language of the statute could be resolved, the statutory framework of
the tax would remain bewilderingly complex. To put the whole system
together, consider the following steps:
(1) The Commissioner sends a deficiency notice, having
previously sent a notice pursuant to section 534(b) of the Code,
alerting the corporate taxpayer to a finding of unreasonable ac-
cumulations by the Internal Revenue Service.
(2) The taxpayer responds with a statement in an attempt to
shift the burden of proof on the reasonable business needs issue
to the Commissioner.
(3) The dispute is brought to the Tax Court, which must first
review the statement to determine if it is sufficient to shift the
burden of proof.
(4) If the taxpayer is found to have successfully shifted the
burden to the Commissioner on the reasonable business needs
Cement Block Co. v. Commissioner, 50 T.C. 317 (1968), acq., 1968-2 C.B. 2; Youngs
Rubber Corp. v. Commissioner, 21 T.C.M. (CCH) 1593 (1962), aff'd, 331 F.2d 12 (2d
Cir. 1964) (per curiam).
87 WEBSTER'S NEW TWENTIETH CENTURY DICTIONARY UNABRIDGED 1201 (2d
ed. 1977). The following synonyms are listed: exigency, emergency, strait, ex-
tremity, necessity, distress, destitution, poverty, indigence, penury.
' See note 31 supra and accompanying text.
89 See Treas. Reg. § 1.537-1(b), T.D. 7165, 1972-1 C.B. 167. Further com-
plicating the task of interpreting the "reasonable business needs" language is its
use at two different points in the statute. The question arises whether it is possi-
ble that a reasonable business need for the purpose of the presumption is not
such a need for purpose of the credit. One commentator who approves injecting
the proscribed purpose inquiry into the presumption's reasonable business needs
test has concluded that the interpretation of reasonable business needs given by
some courts in setting the amount of the accumulated earnings credit has not
been in accord with that given by other courts in determining the presence of the
proscribed purpose. Canty, supra note 1, at 270-71. However the disputes over in-
terpretation should be resolved, language should surely be accorded a uniform
meaning when used in a single taxing statute.
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issue, there must still be a further finding that the Commis-
sioner has not successfully met the burden.
(5) If the Commissioner is unsuccessful and thus the taxpayer
is victorious on the reasonable business needs issue, the Tax
Court must then determine whether the taxpayer has overcome
the presumption of correctness accorded the Commissioner's
determination as to the ultimate issue of whether the taxpayer
accumulated with the intention (whether or not "dominant") of
avoiding tax with respect to its shareholders, there being no
burden shifting on this issue.
(6) If the taxpayer fails and the proscribed purpose is found,
then the Tax Court must determine the amount of the tax.
(7) Finally, the Tax Court would go back to its earlier
reasonable business needs calculations for the purpose of quanti-
fying the accumulated earnings credit and thus calculating the
amount of the tax.90
What if the court in step seven decided that the reasonable business
needs were of such a magnitude that they reduced the accumulated tax-
able income to zero? It would have engaged in the six preliminary steps
for nothing. It is understandable that under these conditions the Tax
Court has disposed of some cases by considering the last issue first."
However, tackling the last step first is not as simple as it might seem.
The Treasury Regulations state that in determining whether any
amount of earnings and profits of the taxable year has been retained for
the reasonable needs of the business, the accumulated earnings and pro-
fits of prior years will be taken into consideration. 2 Therefore, it is en-
tirely possible that a taxpayer would have reasonable business needs
qualifying for the accumulated earnings credit but for prior years' ac-
cumulations. Thus, despite the reasonable business needs of the cor-
poration, there would be no reduction in the accumulated taxable in-
come.
V. WHEN IS A REDEMPTION A REASONABLE NEED OF THE BUSINESS
A redemption is defined in the Internal Revenue Code as an acquisi-
tion by a corporation of its stock from a shareholder in exchange for
property, whether or not the stock so acquired is cancelled, retired, or
held as treasury stock. 3 A redemption of stock will be treated as an ex-
" This is very similar to the procedure which the Sixth Circuit requested of
the Tax Court in the remand of Shaw-Walker Co. v. Commissioner, 412 F.2d 858
(6th Cir. 1969), on remand from 393 U.S. 478 (1969).
91 See note 28 supra and cases cited therein, especially John P. Scripps
Newspapers v. Commissioner, 44 T.C. 453 (1965); Fotocrafters, Inc. v. Commis-
sioner, 19 T.C.M. (CCH) 1401 (1960).
92 Treas. Reg. § 1.535-3(b)(ii) (1960). See Rudolph, supra note 1, at 115-20.
- I.R.C. § 317(b).
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change of stock, the gain thereon being subject to capital gain rates,
provided it falls into one of the following categories: 1) the redemption
is not essentially equivalent to a dividend, taking into consideration all
facts and circumstances;" 2) the redemption is substantially dispropor-
tionate with respect to the shareholders on the basis of a mathematical
test set forth in section 302(b)(2) of the Code;95 3) the redemption
represents a termination of a shareholder's complete interest in the cor-
poration; 96 4) the redemption is of a railroad company in connection with
certain sections of the Bankruptcy Act; 7 or 5) The redemption is. of
stock of a shareholder's estate for purposes of paying certain estate
taxes and other qualifying expenses. If the redemption does not qualify
for capital gains treatment by being characterized under one of the ap-
proved categories, it is treated as a distribution to which section 301 ap-
plies, with the consequence that it is treated as ordinary income to the
extent of any gain within certain limitations.9
Every distribution with respect to stock is considered to have been
made out of the most recently accumulated earnings and profits. 0° To
the extent that the distribution is not chargeable to the corporation's
capital account, any distribution in excess of that taxable year's earn-
ings and profits will decrease earlier years' earnings and profits.'
When can a redemption be characterized as a reasonable business
need? The first complication which comes to mind on the basis of the
foregoing description is that qualifying redemptions, ie., those which
will result in capital gains to the shareholders, and non-qualifying
redemptions, i.e., those which result in section 301 treatment, ought to
be analyzed as different and distinct. A non-qualifying redemption, sub-
jecting shareholder gains to ordinary income treatment, would hardly
be motivated by an intent to minimize shareholder tax burdens. This
common sense conclusion finds support by extrapolation from the quali-
fying redemption cases, although supporting authority is lacking since
non-qualifying redemptions have not been the subject of litigation."2
The other factor complicating the issue is the tendency of courts to
Id. § 302(b)(1).
Id § 302(b)(2).
Id § 302(b)(3).
Id § 302(b)(4).
Id § 303.
Id. § 302(d).
00 Id § 316(a).
101 Id. § 312.
102 An interesting situation did arise in the context of the adjustment to ac-
cumulated taxable income by subtraction of the dividends paid credit. The tax-
payer argued that the redemption of a 50% shareholder gave rise to a dividend
under Code section 562 and the amount of the redemption decreased the ac-
cumulated taxable income by the same amount. The argument was rejected. H.H.
King Flour Mills Co. v. United States, 325 F. Supp. 1085 (D. Minn. 1971).
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confuse the objective reasonable business needs inquiry with the
vagaries of the proscribed purpose issue. Certain early cases linked
redemptions to the proscribed purpose issue by reasoning that if the
corporation had money enough to redeem its shares, it had accumulated
too much money.' 3 That analysis entirely begs the question of whether,
under certain circumstances, redemptions might serve reasonable
business purposes.
The blanket suspicion of redemptions has been especially persuasive
where it is found that a redemption was inconsistent with the other
grounds alleged for justification of accumulations."' The point is well
taken only if the fact of the inconsistency is seen as impeachment
evidence bearing on the taxpayer's purported justification of the ac-
cumulation. Taken as such, the inconsistency is material to the ultimate
issue of corporate intent and the existence of the proscribed purpose.
Precisely because it bears on the intent issue, it is not material to the
business needs inquiry posed by the section 533(a) presumption.
These complications have caused the courts to reach conflicting deci-
sions. Some opinions reach the conclusion that a redemption can never
be a reasonable need of the business.' 5 Others, including nearly all re-
cent cases, have taken a middle ground recognizing some situations in
which redemptions do serve reasonable business needs."0 Under that
analysis, a redemption is a proper purpose for accumulating earnings
and profits if prompted by one or more of these considerations: 1) it is in
"0 Dickman Lumber Co. v. United States, 65-1 U.S.T.C. 9133, 15 A.F.T.R. 2d
027 (W.D. Wash. 1964), aff'd, 355 F.2d 670 (9th Cir. 1966); KOMA, Inc. v. Commis-
sioner, 8 T.C.M. (CCH) 1064 (1949), affd, 189 F.2d 390 (10th Cir. 1951); W.H.
Gunlocke Chair Co. v. Commissioner, 2 T.C.M. (CCH) 885 (1943), aff'd, 145 F.2d
791 (2d Cir. 1944).
' See Pelton Steel Casting Co. v. Commissioner, 28 T.C. 153 (1957), affd, 251
F.2d 278 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 958 (1958) (redemption takes place soon
after time in which taxpayer says it needs money for working capital); KOMA,
Inc. v. Commissioner, 8 T.C.M. (CCH) 1064 (1949), aff'd, 189 F.2d 390 (10th Cir.
1951) (utilizing funds for redemption when it was stated they were needed to in-
stall new capital equipment); W.H. Gunlocke Chair Co. v. Commissioner, 2 T.C.M.
(CCH) 885 (1943), affd, 145 F.2d 791 (2d Cir. 1944) (retirement of preferred stock
inconsistent with program to finance a possible change in business due to com-
petition).
" In a number of these cases the grounds for rejecting the justification of the
accumulation are not clearly delineated. See, e.g., Fenco, Inc. v. United States,
234 F. Supp. 317 (D. Md. 1964), affl'd, 348 F.2d 456 (4th Cir. 1965) (per curiam);
Youngs Rubber Corp. v. Commissioner, 21 T.C.M. (CCH) 1593 (1962), affl'd, 331
F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1964) (per curiam); Trico Prods. Corp. v. Commissioner, 46 B.T.A.
346 (1942), affd, 137 F.2d 424 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 799 (1943).
" See Faber Cement Block Co. v. Commissioner, 50 T.C. 317 (1968), acq.,
1968-2 C.B. 2, where the Tax Court commented that "the courts tend to look
askance at such claimed need for the purposes of the accumulated earnings tax,
particularly where, as is the case herein, there is no evidence that there were
dissenting or competing shareholders factions which threatened corporate
health." 50 T.C. at 335.
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furtherance of corporate harmony, including elimination or avoidance of
minority interests; ' 7 or 2) it is to protect the corporation from liquida-
tion, merger or sale to an outsider. 8 Even those opinions taking this
middle ground persist in weighing shareholder benefit relative to cor-
porate purpose. If shareholder benefit outweighs the corporate purpose,
it disqualifies the redemption as a reasonable business need."'
The decision which clearly stands out among this assortment is Moun-
tain State Steel Foundries, Inc. v. Commissioner."' The corporation
against which the tax was assessed by the Commissioner had been owned
by its two founders, each holding fifty percent of the stock. One
shareholder died; his stock was left in the hands of the beneficiaries of
his estate, who then demanded that the business be sold. The remaining
shareholder attempted to satisfy the beneficiaries by locating a buyer
but was not able to find an interested party at the asking price. As an
alternative, it was suggested that the beneficiaries' stock be redeemed
with a plan of payment to be negotiated. The agreement to do so was
reached in September, 1950, with payments to be made over a period of
forty-four years. The Commissioner assessed the penalty tax for the
first three fiscal years that the corporation accumulated earnings to pay
the debt that arose as a result of the redemption. The Commissioner
was successful in the Tax Court on the theory that this case was in-
distinguishable from Pelton."' The Fourth Circuit reversed on the broad
grounds that the Tax Court's premise that no corporate purpose was
served by the disbursements associated with the redemption was incor-
rect."' The court indicated the point in its analysis at which the redemp-
tion became relevant:
For a long time there was controversy over the tax conse-
quence to shareholders when a corporation made dispropor-
tionate distributions in partial redemption of its stock. Congress
finally acted in this field. Among other things, it specifically pro-
1' Wilcox Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 38 T.C.M. (CCH) 378 (1979); Farmers &
Merchants Inv. Co. v. Commissioner, 29 T.C.M. (CCH) 705 (1970); Oman Constr.
Co. v. Commissioner, 24 T.C.M. (CCH) 1799 (1965); Dill Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner,
39 B.T.A. 1023 (1939), nonacq., 1939-2 C.B. 47.
10 Mountain State Steel Foundries, Inc. v. Commissioner, 18 T.C.M. (CCH) 306
(1959), rev'd, 284 F.2d 737 (4th Cir. 1960). See also Gazette Publishing Co. v. Self,
103 F. Supp. 779 (E.D. Ark. 1952); Penn Needle Art Co. v. Commissioner, 17
T.C.M. (CCH) 504 (1958); cf. Fred F. Fischer v. Commissioner, 6 T.C.M. (CCH) 520
(1947) (Redemption is proper purpose for accumulating earnings and profits if
prompted by protecting corporation from liquidation, merger, or sale to an out-
sider).
1" Two very good examples of this approach are John B. Lambert & Assoc. v.
United States, 212 Ct. Cl. 71 (1976) and Cadillac Textiles, Inc. v. Commissioner, 34
T.C.M. (CCH) 295 (1975).
,10 284 F.2d 737 (4th Cir. 1960), rev'g. 18 T.C.M. (CCH) 306 (1959).
" 18 T.C.M. (CCH) at 312. For a discussion of the facts of Pelton see notes
76-79 supra and accompanying text.
112 284 F.2d at 744.
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vided that partial redemption of the shares held by an estate
would be treated as a sale, not as a distribution of earnings, if
the amount of the distribution did not exceed the estate's
liabilities for estate and inheritance taxes, interest and funeral
and administration expenses [section 303]. When Congress
specifically provided favorable tax treatment for such transac-
tions and sought to encourage them to facilitate the administra-
tion of estates, it hardly could have intended to penalize the cor-
poration for doing the favored act.
We need not say that under no circumstances may a stock
purchase be relevant to a question arising under § 102 of the
1939 Code [predecessor to sections 531-537.]. When it is done out
of cash accumulations which reasonably may be thought ex-
cessive, such a purchase, along with other factors, may be con-
sidered appropriately in arriving at ultimate findings. The fact
of redemption, of itself, however, furnishes no basis for imposi-
tion of the § 102 tax. In the circumstances in which they were
made, the disbursements in payment for the stock, themselves,
do not support a finding that they were withdrawn from excess
funds accumulated from earnings beyond reasonable corpora-
tion need. Nor is the situation altered by the fact that [the
founders] may have been aware that travel along another route
would have cost something more in taxes. If they had a choice of
routes, they were not required to choose the one which would be
most costly to them in taxes."'
Although the language quoted is dictum given the primary holding in
the case, the message of Mountain State is this: consideration of
benefits to shareholders resulting from a redemption is relevant in
reaching "ultimate findings" concerning the existence of the proscribed
purpose. However, the bare fact that a redemption has occurred is not
relevant to the reasonable business needs inquiry, the "trigger
mechanism" of the section 533 presumption.
VI. SOME COMMON PROBLEMS
A. Distinction Between Majority and Minority Redemptions
Some cases have noted that a redemption will be considered a
reasonable business need if it is a redemption of a minority interest."'
The rule seems logical when stated: minority interests do not control
the corporation; therefore, any intent associated with producing a tax
benefit for the minority interests cannot be attributed to the corpora-
tion. This rule apparently stems from Pelton. In dealing with the majority
11 Id at 745 (dictum) (emphasis added).
114 Farmers & Merchants Inv. Co. v. Commissioner, 29 T.C.M. (CCH) 705
(1970). See Wilcox Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 38 T.C.M. (CCH) 378 (1979);
Hedberg-Freidheim Contracting Co. v. Commissioner, 15 T.C.M. (CCH) 1433
(1956), aff'd, 251 F.2d 839 (8th Cir. 1958).
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redemption in that case, the Tax Court sought to distinguish two earlier
decisions favorable to the taxpayer"5 by pointing out that these were
minority redemptions. However, the Tax Court in Pelton was careful to
enumerate additional grounds for distinguishing those cases."6
In addressing the issue of whether this is a valid distinction, first it
must be decided what is a "majority" or "minority" interest. Will the
rules of constructive ownership apply?"7 This is crucial in accumulated
earnings cases since they often involve family-owned companies." 8 Fur-
thermore, does "majority" here refer to the total amount of stock
redeemed or to the total amount of stock owned by the shareholder
desiring the redemption? In at least one case where the shareholder
owned more than a majority of the stock but was not completely
redeemed, the court did not find the proscribed purpose."9 If the
redemption is completed in a series of separate transactions, must they
be aggregated to decide whether a majority or minority redemption has
taken place? A further complication exists in those situations where
there are two or more classes of stock, one of which may be
non-voting.' ° Finally, a special problem is associated with the fifty per-
cent interest because it often means the corporation is subject to
deadlock. 2'
Leaving these difficulties to one side, it may be that the distinction
could be useful in deciding whether a redemption is indicative of the re-
"-' Gazette Publishing Co. v. Self, 103 F. Supp. 779 (E.D. Ark. 1952); Dill Mfg.
Co. v. Commissioner, 39 B.T.A. 1023 (1939), nonacq., 1939-2 C.B. 47.
116 Dill was distinguished on these additional facts: 1) the burden of proof was
upon the Commissioner in that case; 2) the Commissioner was never able to prove
that there was a scheme planned for many years to buy out the minority interest;
3) there were reasons to justify the accumulations on other grounds. Gazette
Publishing Co. was distinguished on the fact that the officers of the taxpayer
knew that a sale to an outsider was imminent. Pelton Steel Casting Co. v. Com-
missioner, 28 T.C. 153, 176 (1957), affd, 251 F.2d 278 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 356
U.S. 958 (1958).
'" See I.R.C. § 318.
,,8 E.g., John B. Lambert & Assoc. v. United States, 212 Ct. Cl. 71 (1976) (hus-
band and wife owners); Cadillac Textiles, Inc. v. Commissioner, 34 T.C.M. (CCH)
295 (1975).
" Ted Bates & Co. v. Commissioner, 24 T.C.M. (CCH) 1346 (1965).
KOMA, Inc. v. Commissioner, 8 T.C.M. (CCH) 1064 (1949), affd, 189 F.2d
390 (10th Cir. 1951); Walhup Drayage & Warehouse Co. v. Commissioner, 4
T.C.M. (CCH) 695 (1945); W.H. Gunlocke Chair Co. v. Commissioner, 2 T.C.M.
(CCH) 885 (1943), aff'd, 145 F.2d 791 (2d Cir. 1944); Trico Prods. Corp. v. Commis-
sioner, 46 B.T.A. 346 (1942), aff'd, 137 F.2d 424 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 799
(1943).
'" E.g., John B. Lambert & Assoc. v. United States, 212 Ct. Cl. 71 (1976);
Cadillac Textiles, Inc. v. Commissioner, 34 T.C.M. (CCH) 295 (1975); Penn Needle
Art Co. v. Commissioner, 17 T.C.M. (CCH) 504 (1958); Hedberg-Freidheim Con-
tracting Co. v. Commissioner, 15 T.C.M. (CCH) 1433 (1956), aff'd, 251 F.2d 839 (8th
Cir. 1958).
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quired state of mind.'22 A tax-savings motivation attributable to majority
shareholders may ultimately be attributed to the corporate taxpayer.
However, in considering the question of what is a reasonable business
need, the majority/minority distinction is not as useful. At this level, the
focus is not on the corporate state of mind but on what the corporation
needs. A redemption may serve a reasonable need of the business in a
variety of situations not affected by relative size of shareholder in-
terests, such as insuring corporate harmony, promoting efficiency, or
preserving loyalty of management. There does not seem to be a good
reason to be more suspicious of a redemption merely because it is a
redemption of a majority interest.
B. Redemption of Dissenting Shareholders
Another common distinction drawn for the purpose of classifying
redemptions is to bless those which are for the purpose of eliminating
dissent. Where continued business operation is threatened by dissen-
sion between incompatible shareholder groups, there is a business pur-
pose for the redemption. 2 ' To what degree the conflict must have
jeopardized corporate operations is uncertain.
Certain early decisions raised the hope that the differences need not
be too severe before a redemption could be justified.2 4 However, these
cases concerned unplanned redemptions. Each corporation involved had
originally advanced different reasons for the accumulations. When the
accumulated funds subsequently were used to complete redemptions,
such action was explained on the basis that the redemptions were unan-
ticipated.'25
Recent decisions indicate that the conflict may require corporate
paralysis before the funding of a redemption will be an accumulation
which is in furtherance of the reasonable needs of the business. In John
B. Lambert & Associates v. United States"6 the redemption was of the
'" See John B. Lambert & Assoc. v. United States, 212 Ct. Cl. 71 (1976);
Cadillac Textiles, Inc. v. Commissioner, 34 T.C.M. (CCH) 295 (1975).
"2 Mountain State Steel Foundries, Inc. v. Commissioner, 284 F.2d 737 (4th
Cir. 1960); Faber Cement Block Co. v. Commissioner, 50 T.C. 317 (1968), acq.,
1968-2 C.B. 2; Kirlin Co. v. Commissioner, 23 T.C.M. (CCH) 1580 (1964), aff'd, 361
F.2d 818 (6th Cir. 1966) (per curiam); Youngs Rubber Corp. v. Commissioner, 21
T.C.M. (CCH) 1593 (1962), affd, 331 F.2d 12 (2nd Cir. 1964) (per curiam); Dill Mfg.
Co. v. Commissioner, 39 B.T.A. 1023 (1939), nonacq., 1939-2 C.B. 47.
" Gazette Publishing Co. v. Self, 103 F. Supp. 779 (E.D. Ark. 1952); Penn
Needle Art Co. v. Commissioner, 17 T.C.M. (CCH) 504 (1958).
12 In Gazette Publishing Co., the redemption "was a complete surprise to the
president and board of directors of the corporation." 103 F. Supp. at 782. in Penn
Needle Art Co., the trouble "came about suddenly and the decision to [redeem)...
was not the result of some long term planning or desire to distribute earn-
ings ...." 17 T.C.M. (CCH) at 509. See Herwitz, supra note 1, at 906-07.
I' 212 Ct. Cl. 71 (1976). It is notable that because the forum is the Court of
Claims, no Code section 534 burden of proof statement was permitted.
1979]
25Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1979
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
wife's fifty percent interest in the corporation, where the husband owned
the remaining interest. The redemption took place in 1969, and the tax-
able years in question were the calendar years 1967 and 1968. The tax-
payer argued that in the years prior to the redemption the wife had
become conservative in her business philosophy and requested redemp-
tion so that she could devote more time to her family. She was opposed
to a policy of expansion and made that known. While the actual redemp-
tion did not occur until 1969, there were a number of preliminary ar-
rangements made with her redemption in mind.
The United States Court of Claims reviewed the matter on the tax-
payer's request for a refund. An opening remark in the opinion was that
the taxpayer and the Commissioner agreed that "under certain cir-
cumstances ... an accumulation of earnings to fund a stock redemption
may constitute an accumulation for a 'reasonable need of the business'
within the meanings of Sections 535(c) and 537."'1 Despite this agree-
ment by the litigants, the court's own assessment of when a redemption
serves a reasonable business need appeared to be narrower. It fixed
upon "the concept of a protective redemption" which is apparent only in
those situations where there is a threatened liquidation, an unexpected
serious rupture or the strong possibility of a sale to outsiders who
would be hostile to present corporate policies.128 Here, the wife's posi-
tion was held not to have created the need for such a protective redemp-
tion.
Similar is Cadillac Textiles, Inc. v. Commissioner,' in which two
brothers had had a disagreement over a scheme to invest in a new type
of power loom. The Tax Court nevertheless found that the redemption
was more closely related to the older brother's personal health and to
the treatment of the proceeds of the redemption as a capital gain than
to satisfaction of reasonable business needs. There was testimony that
the brothers were on the best of terms, but it is not clear whether that
was in respect of their personal feelings for one another or as
businessmen.2 0 The Tax Court stated that "[tlhis is not a situation
where the operation of the business would come to a stand-still or the
company would be threatened with liquidation if the conflict among the
shareholders were [sic] permitted to continue." '131
These cases should be contrasted with Farmers & Merchants Invest-
ment Co. v. Commissioner,'32 where an accumulation to meet the cor-
porate obligations to a minority shareholder redeemed in a year prior to
the assessed years was held to be a reasonable need of the business.
&7 I at 79.
12 Id. at 81.
2 34 T.C.M. (CCH) 295 (1975).
120 Id at 308.
131 Id
13 29 T.C.M. (CCH) 705 (1970).
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The description of the circumstances surrounding the redemption show
that it was at the insistence of one shareholder alone and not tied to any
argument over corporate policy.'" In fact, as in Cadillac Textiles there
was a finding that the shareholders were on good terms with one
another. Nonetheless, it was held: "The promotion of harmony in the
conduct of the business is a proper business purpose. If redeeming the
stock of one stockholder in a closely held corporation is designed to
secure it against dissension amongst those who determine business
policy, the redemption is justified as a business need.""'3 This holding
sanctions a redemption in a situation of less than imminent doom for the
corporation.
In a recent well-reasoned tax court memorandum opinion, Wilcox
Manufacturing Co., Inc., v. Commissioner, '35 Judge Tannenwald cited
Mountain State'36 for the proposition that redemptions of the stock of
minority shareholders to promote harmony in the business met the
reasonable business needs test. Wilcox involved two separate
shareholder redemptions. The first redemption was of a dissenting
minority shareholder's interest. The shareholder, who had carried
significant management responsibility in the corporation, had determined
to leave because of longstanding policy disagreements with the corpora-
tion's president and majority shareholder.
In touching on the issue of the degree of corporate disruption re-
quired to legitimate accumulations for redemption of dissenting
shareholders as "reasonable business needs," the opinion notes:
A.G. Wilcox, Jr., disagreed with Todd on a number of policy
questions. Although the fact that Todd tried to persuade him to
stay on raises some question as to the severity of the rift be-
tween the two men, we are satisfied that serious differences did
exist. Given that A.G. Wilcox, Jr., insisted on leaving the com-
pany, it is clear that it served the interests of Wilcox [the cor-
porate taxpayer] to redeem his shares. The alternative would
have been to risk his selling to an undesirable third party or, in
the event he was unable to find a buyer, to suffer the disruption
that would undoubtedly be caused by, in effect, forcing him to
remain a shareholder.'3 7
Rather than speculating on the intensity of the conflict in the minds of
the principals' as was done in Cadillac Textiles and Lambert, the focus
of Judge Tannenwald's analysis is the forseeable effect of the dispute on
the business.
" Id at 711.
34 Id
'" Wilcox Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 38 T.C.M. (CCH) 378, 394 (1979).
' Mountain State Steel Foundries, Inc. v. Commissioner, 284 F.2d 737 (4th
Cir. 1960).
"' 38 T.C.M. at 394.
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Under the Wilcox rationale, a bona fide decision on the part of an in-
dependent minority shareholder to get out of the business would be suf-
ficient to qualify a redemption as undertaken to meet a reasonable
business need. However, courts will often be faced with dissension be-
tween shareholders who are bound by close personal ties, as in Lambert
and Cadillac Textiles, where the dissenter might be unwilling to subject
the majority to the worst effects of corporate discord. In such cases,
courts will still be forced to choose between speculating on the will-
ingness of the dissenter to actually disrupt corporate operations and
denying the reasonableness of the accumulation until actual damage has
occurred.
The dissenting shareholder problem is often framed in terms of
redeeming the estate of a deceased shareholder. To the extent that the
earnings and profits are accumulated in the year of the shareholder's
death and thereafter fund a redemption in connection with section 303,
this problem no longer exists. Section 537 as amended by the Tax
Reform Act of 196913 specifically provides that such a redemption is a
reasonable business need. However, prior to the 1969 act, authority ex-
isted that such a redemption would not be considered a reasonable
business need since it was prompted by a shareholder purpose.139 In in-
stances where a corporation desires to fund a redemption program
before a shareholder dies, the situation still arises.
The second of the two redemptions in Wilcox involved the estate of
the majority shareholder. He had been killed in an air accident just
three months after the redemption of the minority shareholder's in-
terest. The court held the corporation liable for the accumulated earn-
ings tax with respect to the later redemption. Liability was based
directly on the presence of the prohibited purpose, determined without
recourse to the section 531(a) presumption.40 The opinion notes the
potential for abuse "that would exist if a corporation could accumulate
large amounts to redeem stock of deceased shareholders far in advance
of the likelihood of their deaths, especially where life insurance is a
realistic alternative.'.' Where insurance cannot be obtained on the
Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 906, 83 Stat. 487, 714 (1969).
Kirlin Co. v. Commissioner, 23 T.C.M. (CCH) 1580 (1964), affd, 361 F.2d 818
(6th Cir. 1966) (per curiam); Youngs Rubber Co. v. Commissioner, 21 T.C.M. (CCH)
1593 (1962), aff'd, 331 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1964) (per curiam).
140 Judge Tannenwald expressed doubt as to whether a corporate purpose was
served by the corporation's shareholder agreement, which provided that each
shareholder's stock would be redeemed upon his death whether or not he had
been active in the conduct of the business and "without regard to the effect of
[the shareholder's] death on corporate operations." Wilcox Mfg. Co. v. Commis-
sioner, 38 T.C.M. (CCH) 378, 394 (1979). A demonstrated corporate policy of
building up the equity interest of management through distribution of the
redeemed shares to individuals active in the business might have allayed Judge
Tannenwald's doubts.
... Id. at 394-95.
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shareholder's life or the block of stock is so large that reliance on future
years' earnings may not be prudent, accumulations prior to death may
be the only feasible alternative.
There is some precedent to support the position that the inherent
conflict between living shareholders active in management and estate
holding stock for income purposes provides a valid business reason to
plan for a redemption. In Mountain State it was remarked that closely
held corporations are worth substantially more to those who operate
the business than to outside shareholders:
This sort of situation leads to demands for dividends out of con-
sideration of the stockholders' personal financial need, perhaps
without appropriate regard for the need of the corporation to
make capital expenditures in order to maintain a competitive
position. On the other hand, those stockholders active in the
management of the business deriving salaries from it may be
able to afford indulgence of an ambition to enlarge future earn-
ings through still larger current capital expenditures, an in-
dulgence which other stockholders may ill afford.' 2
In accord with Wilcox and Mountain State is Oman Construction Co.,
Inc., v. Commissioner.' There two brothers had an understanding that
in the event of the death of one, his stock would be redeemed by the cor-
poration. The purpose of the agreement was to ensure that the deceased
brother's widow and children would not be dependent upon the corpora-
tion's future earnings. The surviving shareholder would then be able to
continue the business without following conservative policies to protect
those individuals.'" One of the brothers died unexpectedly, and his in-
terests were redeemed with insurance proceeds paid to the corporation
plus cash. Without considering whether the "understanding" was for a
shareholder or corporate purpose, the Tax Court stated that "[riedemp-
tion of stock of a minority stockholder is a valid business purpose, and
funds retained for such a purpose are retained for the reasonable needs
of the business."'' 5 It should also be noted that the court was of the opin-
ion that the untimely death of a key man was not the time for making
dividends or otherwise reducing the corporate surplus.'46
The cases of Mountain State, Farmers & Merchants, Oman Construc-
tion and Wilcox Manufacturing seem closer to an appropriate concep-
tion of reasonable needs of the business than the more narrowly drawn
decisions. First, the reasonably anticipated needs of the business are
specified by the statute as the appropriate standard. In this light a rule
sanctioning only redemptions consummated at the eleventh hour before
1' 284 F.2d at 744-45.
11 24 T.C.M. (CCH) 1799 (1965).
144 1
"' IM at 1810.
146 Id
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corporate chaos seems too restrictive. Second, those decisions which
view redemptions involving dissenting shareholders skeptically because
the conflict between shareholders was not of "sufficient" intensity,
share an underlying notion that the redeemed shareholders have been
significantly benefitted in that they are withdrawing their corporate in-
terest at capital gains rates. As has already been stated, the reasonable
business needs issue is best decided without reference to shareholder
benefit.
C. Buy-Out Agreements and Other Forms of Stock Redemption Plans
Several courts have stated that to qualify as a reasonable business
need a redemption must not only be shown to have served a business
purpose but that the taxpayer must also have had a specific, definite
and feasible plan concerning the prospective redemption.'47 The
Treasury Regulations lend support to this position, but there are no
hard and fast rules as to the extent of formality required of the plan."8
In any event, the popularity and desirability of buy-out agreements and
other forms of stock redemption plans as business and estate planning
tools has led to much speculation as to whether they serve a reasonable
business need." 9 While a written plan would evidence the seriousness of
the corporation's commitment to the redemption and counteract charges
of vagueness, it seems unlikely that the mere existence of a plan would
bootstrap what was otherwise not a reasonable business need into the
reasonable business need category."'
Certain early cases dealt with redemptions in connection with prefer-
red stock redemption programs. In those cases, to the extent that the
redemptions were inconsistent with other purported needs of the
business, the use of funds for redeeming such shares was held to
evidence the existence of the proscribed purpose. 51 One later case came
to a different conclusion when considering the type of redemption plan
utilized to reward key management.1 52 The redemption plan was struc-
tured in a fashion allowing the majority stockholder to be redeemed in
47 JJJ Corp. v. United States, 576 F.2d 327 (Ct. Cl. 1978); Cadillac Textiles,
Inc. v. Commissioner, 34 T.C.M. (CCH) 295, 309 (1975).
' Treas. Reg. § 1.536-1(b)(1) (1960). See Empire Steel Castings, Inc. v. Com-
missioner, 33 T.C.M. (CCH) 155, 165 (1974); Bremerton Sun Publishing Co. v. Com-
missioner, 44 T.C. 566, 584-85 (1965). But see John P. Scripps Newspapers v. Com-
missioner, 44 T.C. 453, 469 (1965), where the Tax Court remarked that "a closely-
held corporation cannot be held to the same strict formalities of large public cor-
porations."
19 See Kahn, supra note 1, at 3-9.
150 See Herwitz, supra note 1, at 916-20. See also notes 142, 144 supra and ac-
companying text.
Ill KOMA, Inc. v. Commissioner, 8 T.C.M. (CCH) 1064 (1949), aff'd, 189 F.2d
390 (10th Cir. 1951); W.H. Gunlocke Chair Co. v. Commissioner, 2 T.C.M. (CCH)
885 (1943), affd, 145 F.2d 791 (2d Cir. 1944). But see Metal Office Furniture Co. v.
Commissioner, 11 T.C.M. (CCH) 1066 (1952).
" Ted Bates & Co. v. Commissioner, 24 T.C.M. (CCH) 1346 (1965).
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part and to sell another part of his stock to members of the corporate
management. As part of this stock realignment, the stockholder re-
quested and received a private letter ruling stating that the redemption
qualified as a substantially disproportionate redemption pursuant to
section 302(b). It was found that the stockholder reluctantly allowed his
stock to be redeemed, recognizing it was in the best interest of the cor-
poration. The business reasons advanced for the redemption included
the threat to corporate financial stability that would occur upon the
death of the majority stockholder, which would trigger an obligation by
the corporation to redeem his stock pursuant to an unrelated stock
redemption agreement, and the welding of top management personnel
to the corporation by increasing their equity interest.'53 The Tax Court
held that the redemption of the stock did not evidence any unlawful in-
tent on the part of the taxpayer, the transaction not being undertaken
for personal reasons. 5' Interestingly enough, the court stated in a foot-
note that the taxpayer was not allowed any increase in its accumulated
earnings credit as a result of the existence of the redemption plan. This
was so because the amounts the taxpayer received from the sale of its
stock to certain employees exceeded the amount the taxpayer became
obligated to pay pursuant to the terms of the plan.155 Nonetheless, the
note stated that "[i]t is clear that under appropriate circumstances, the
retention of earnings to create a reserve to fund a corporate obligation
to redeem or repurchase some of its stock may constitute a reasonable
business need."'N'
VII. CONCLUSION
In the accumulated earnings tax, Congress has saddled practitioners
and the courts with an unwieldly statute, difficult at best to apply in
practice and subject to frequent misinterpretation. The practitioner's
problem is exacerbated by the magnitude of the penalty tax that results
from a finding of liability. In dealing with redemptions, the courts
should take care to distinguish between factors which are relevant to
the proscribed purpose issue and those relevant to the reasonable
business needs issue. The determination of whether the proscribed pur-
pose exists is inherently subjective and consideration by the courts of
shareholder benefit at this level is appropriate. However, this factor is
of no import to the determination whether the accumulation was for the
reasonable business needs of the corporation. Therefore, the tax should
not be imposed on accumulations to fund a redemption which serves a
reasonable business need of the corporation. A lack of uniformity in
decisions in this area is a direct result of the courts' failure to discern
this distinction. Continued confusion on this point will make what is
already complicated almost inscrutable.
1 Id. at 1355.
Id. at 1364-65.
Id. at 1363 n.9.
15 Id.
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